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I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 is one of the most effec-
tive federal antidiscrimination statutes in employment discrimination
law. Enforcement of this statute has eliminated discriminatory acts di-
rected at individual victims as well as discriminatory policies and prac-
tices directed at groups that traditionally have been victims of
discrimination. The effectiveness of Title VII in eliminating employ-
ment policies that restrict opportunities for a group or class of employ-
ees (referred to as systemic discrimination) has been particularly
* Assistant Professor, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell Uni-
versity; B.A., Lincoln University, 1970; MLIR, School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Michigan
State University, 1972; J.D., George Washington University, 1979. The Author wishes to thank
Professors Michael Gold and James Gross for their suggestions and comments after reading drafts
of this Article. The Author also acknowledges comments and suggestions from Professor Risa Lie-
berwitz and from other participants in the Research Seminar in the Department of Collective Bar-
gaining, Labor Law and Labor History. Finally, the Author acknowledges the research assistance
of the following students: Cary Burnell, Cynthia Duke, Douglas van den Bergh, and Trina Jones.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
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important because of the economic, psychological, and social conse-
quences that this discrimination has on members of the group as a
whole. Also, this type of discrimination conflicts with fundamental con-
stitutional principles of equality on which this society is based.
Since enactment of Title VII, private plaintiffs have played a major
role in the elimination of systemic discrimination. Class action lawsuits
and individual litigation by private plaintiffs have resulted in the elimi-
nation of discriminatory tests, seniority systems, height and weight re-
quirements, and other policies and practices that have prevented
blacks, Hispanics, women, older workers, and other minorities from
achieving their employment potential. Despite the role that private
plaintiffs have played in eliminating systemic discrimination, some
courts have begun restricting the right to challenge this discrimination
by interpreting narrowly the procedural provisions of Title VII, which
makes it difficult for private plaintiffs even to file charges alleging sys-
temic discrimination. One procedural issue that threatens to restrict the
private plaintiff's ability to challenge systemic discrimination is court
interpretation of the continuing violation theory.
The continuing violation theory, considered to be one of the most
confusing theories in employment discrimination law,- is a procedural
theory developed by courts that modifies the normal statute of limita-
tions when the employer's discrimination exists prior to and during the
limitations period.3 This modification affects both the courts' jurisdic-
tion over a charge of discrimination and the remedies courts may im-
pose. Because conflict exists among courts over application of the
theory to specific situations, a description of how the theory affects
remedies and jurisdiction is problematic. In general, however, the the-
ory allows a court to impose a remedy not only for discrimination that
has occurred within the statute of limitations period, but also for dis-
criminatory acts that otherwise would be time barred. In order to re-
ceive a remedy for discriminatory acts that occur after the limitations
period has expired, the plaintiff first will have to prove that those acts
were part of a pattern of discrimination that continued into the statute
2. See Berry v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 979 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 232 (1986); Elliot v. Sperry Rand Co., 79 F.R.D. 580, 585 (D. Minn. 1978),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 680 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 1982); Brooks, McGinn & Cary, Second Gener-
ation Problems Facing Employers in Employment Discrimination Cases: Continuing Violations,
Pendent State Claims and Double Attorneys' Fees, 49 LAw & CoNTEM. PROBS., Autumn 1986, at
25, 26; Jackson & Matheson, The Continuing Violation Theory and the Concept of Jurisdiction in
Title VII Suits, 67 Geo. L.J. 811, 819-23 (1979).
3. For historical development of the theory, see generally 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION § 48.13(F) (1987), and B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAW 1042-53 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1983-1984).
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of limitations period.' When the continuing violation theory is applied
to a series of discriminatory acts against a single individual, the juris-
dictional branch of the theory allows a court to assert jurisdiction over
a charge of discrimination even though discrimination against the plain-
tiff began prior to the statute of limitations period.5 The plaintiff must
4. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 1047. Title VII requires that a charge of
discrimination be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e) (1982). Charging parties, however, usually have 300 days to file the charge. Prior to
filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the federal agency that en-
forces Title VII, an individual first must file the charge with a state or local antidiscrimination
agency if the law of that jurisdiction prohibits the type of discrimination alleged. The state or local
agency has a maximum of 120 days to process the charge. This requirement extends the filing
period to 300 days. Id. § 2000e-5(c). An individual filing a charge of discrimination is referred to as
the "charging party." See, e.g., EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 1 2027 (Apr. 1988). For purposes of
consistency, charging parties will be referred to as plaintiffs in this Article.
Consider, for example, an employer who posted three job vacancies for promotions over a two
year period. A qualified female who applied for each of the vacancies was denied the job each time,
twice in 1985 and once in 1986. Because Title VII requires that a charge of discrimination be filed
within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, she filed a charge of discrimination
within 180 days of the 1986 promotion denial. She alleged, however, that the 1985 acts of discrimi-
nation should be actionable for remedial purposes. Most courts would hold that a remedy to cover
the 1985 promotion denials, such as back pay, can be imposed if she can show that those denials
were part of a pattern of discrimination against her. See generally O'Keefe, The Effect of the
Continuing Violations Theory on Title VII Back Pay Calculations, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 262
(1983). Back pay as a remedy is limited by Title VII's requirement that back pay liability "shall
not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1982). A remedy covering prelimitations violations will not be imposed if the plaintiff knew or
should have known that the acts were discriminatory at the time of their occurrence. See B. ScHLEI
& P. GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 1431. As with an individual employee, if an employer discrimi-
nates against a class of employees, the continuing violation theory allows a court to impose a rem-
edy that covers the entire period that the class was victimized by discrimination, including a
remedy for discriminatory practices not within the statute of limitations. See, e.g., McKenzie v.
Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Association Against Discrimination in Employment v.
City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 274 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982). In both
situations, the plaintiffs must prove that the statute of limitations has not expired on a violation
before recovery is allowed for time-barred discriminatory acts or policies. See infra notes 25-42
and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Note, Continuing Violations of Title VII: A Suggested Approach, 63 MINN. L.
REv. 119, 122-23 (1978). Consider, for example, an employer who does not post job vacancies, but
instead selects individuals for promotion to supervisor on an as needed basis. The plant manager, a
white male, has sole discretion in selecting persons for promotion to supervisory positions. A quali-
fied female employee sends a letter to the plant manager in January 1985, informing him of her
interest in becoming a supervisor. The plant manager selects two males as supervisors in April
1985, but the female does not file a charge of discrimination within 180 days of either selection. In
1986 the female does not send a letter to the plant manager, but the manager promotes a male to a
supervisory position. The female files a charge of discrimination within 180 days of the 1986 selec-
tion, alleging that the plant manager is engaging in a pattern of discrimination against her. The
employer argues that the plaintiff's charge is time barred because she did not submit a letter
requesting a promotion (interpreted as applying for a job) in 1986. Instead, she submitted her
letter in 1985, and she did not file charges within 180 days of the 1985 selections. Most courts
would hold that failure to submit a letter of request for promotion to a supervisory position in
1986 would not bar plaintiff's charge because she is alleging that continuing failure to consider her
for promotion to a supervisory position is a continuing violation, and her charge was filed within
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prove that the time-barred act of discrimination was part of a pattern,
and that an act which furthered the pattern occurred within the limita-
tions period.
This Article focuses on the jurisdictional issue of what constitutes
timely filing when a plaintiff alleges a continuing violation based on the
continuing existence of an alleged discriminatory policy or practice. The
issue of timely filing in systemic discrimination cases generally is raised
in two situations: (1) A female employee files a charge of discrimination
alleging that a company policy which excludes women from working in
certain jobs discriminates against her as well as against women as a
class, but she has not applied for and been denied a job in the excluded
categories; and (2) A female employee files a charge of discrimination
alleging that a company policy which excludes women from working in
certain jobs discriminates against her as well as women as a class, but
the statute of limitations expired after she received notification of the
policy or was denied a job under the policy. A jurisdictional issue arises
in the first example (i.e., no direct injury occurring) because the lan-
guage of Title VII assumes that a specific act will affect an individual.'
Section 706(e) states, in part, that a charge of discrimination must be
filed within 180 days "after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred."' In the second example (i.e., the statute of limitations ex-
pired after notification of the policy), the jurisdictional issue arises be-
180 days of the last act that furthered the pattern of discrimination. Cf. Cajigas v. Banco de Ponce,
741 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1984) (suggesting that the continuing violation theory appropriately may be
limited to a situation in which there is no single act of discrimination sufficient to trigger the
running of the limitations period).
This Article does not focus on application of the continuing violation theory to a series of
single acts of discrimination against a specific individual. Because of the many factual circum-
stances to which the continuing violation theory applies, courts have not been consistent in deter-
mining what constitutes a pattern of discrimination, as opposed to a series of unrelated acts that
are not part of a pattern. Cf. Berry, 715 F.2d at 981 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 232
(1986). In Berry the Fifth Circuit articulated a general standard for resolving these issues. Id. at
981-82. The three factors that the Fifth Circuit considered critical in determining whether a pat-
tern of discrimination existed were: (1) whether the alleged acts involve the same subject matter;
(2) whether the acts are frequent or infrequent; and (3) whether the acts possess a degree of per-
manence. The court considered the last standard to be the most critical standard. Thus, if the acts
have a degree of permanence, the employee should assert her right to challenge those acts when
they occur. Recent court decisions have adopted or cited with approval the Berry standards. See
Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp., 835 F.2d 793, 800 (11th Cir. 1988); Santos v. Rush-Presbyte-
rian St. Luke's Medical Center, 641 F. Supp. 353, 358 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Arna v. Northwestern Univ.,
640 F. Supp. 923, 926 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Zewde v. Elgin Community College, 601 F. Supp. 1237, 1242-
43 (N.D. I1. 1984); see also Brooks, McGinn & Cary, supra note 2, at 31-32.
6. Cf. Jackson & Matheson, supra note 2, at 824-25 (noting that, in pattern or practice suits
brought by the EEOC, the focus is not on any single act of discrimination, but on an employer's
policy of discrimination, even though the agency is required to comply with the Act's filing
requirements).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982).
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cause notice of the alleged violation normally begins the running of the
statute of limitations period,8 and a charge filed more than 180 days
after notice would be time barred.
In both examples, a policy of discrimination exists within the limi-
tations period, but courts disagree on when a plaintiff can challenge the
policy under Title VII. Although courts generally hold that a policy of
discrimination is a continuing violation, some have held that a specific
act under the policy must occur within the limitations period before the
policy can be challenged." Other courts have held that the ongoing pol-
icy is the "occurrence," making a charge of discrimination timely as
long as the policy exists."0 One court distinguishes between a facially
discriminatory policy and a facially neutral but discriminatory policy,""
holding that the former can be challenged as long as the policy exists,1 2
but the latter must be challenged within 180 days of the date that the
plaintiff knew or should have known that the policy was
discriminatory. 13
Application of the continuing violation theory to specific employ-
ment policies and practices varies among and within circuits, making it
difficult to categorize the approaches used by courts. 4 Considering this
limitation, three general standards can be identified to determine
timely filing of continuing violations charges that are based on systemic
discrimination. The first, the date-of-notification/injury standard, con-
siders the violation to be a single act pursuant to the policy that affects
the plaintiff and requires the plaintiff to file a charge within 180 days of
that act. 5 The second standard, the manifestation/enforcement stan-
dard, considers an alleged policy of discrimination (i.e., systemic dis-
crimination) to be a continuing violation and allows the plaintiff to
challenge the policy within 180 days of enforcement or manifestation of
the policy against the plaintiff or someone in the plaintiff's class.' 6 The
8. Delaware College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259 (1980).
9. For a description of standards developed by courts, see infra notes 15-17 and accompany-
ing text.
10. See infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
11. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 827 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W.
3627 (Feb. 26, 1988) (No. 87-1428).
12. Id. at 167.
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 78-153 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Lorance, 827 F.2d 163 (facially neutral but discriminatory seniority system);
EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 211, 217-20 (3d Cir. 1983) (discriminatory layoff
plan), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984); Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv.,
667 F.2d 1074, 1080-81 (3d Cir. 1981) (discriminatory exam), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1982).
16. See, e.g., Furr v. AT&T Technologies, 824 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1987) (pattern and prac-
tice of age discrimination); Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986)
(facially discriminatory employment program); Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849 (4th Cir.
1988] 1175
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third standard, the ongoing policy standard, considers an alleged policy
of discrimination to be a continuing violation for which charges are al-
ways timely, as long as the plaintiff remains subject to the policy. 17 This
Article, which focuses on formal employer policies, written and unwrit-
ten,'8 analyzes these standards to determine the appropriate standard
in cases alleging a continuing violation based on systemic
discrimination.
This Article proposes that the proper standard must be one that
effectuates the substantive goals of the laws prohibiting employment
discrimination, particularly Title VII. Based on this consideration, the
Article posits that Title VII's specific goal of eliminating systemic dis-
crimination requires first that the alleged violation be defined as a sys-
temic discriminatory policy, also referred to as a continuing violation.19
Because the policy is the present violation, the statute of limitations
should be interpreted in a manner that facilitates elimination of the
policy. Part II of this Article analyzes the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,0 a Title VII case, to
determine whether the Court, in the context of its holding on continu-
ing violation theory, resolved the statute of limitations issue. The Court
in Evans focused on whether the present effects of past discrimination
constitute a continuing violation. Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's
1985) (pattern and practice of age discrimination), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986); Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980) (discriminatory test), aff'd on other
grounds, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
17. See, e.g., Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir.) (pattern and prac-
tice of discrimination), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); Roberts v. North Am. Rockwell Corp.,
650 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1981) (facially discriminatory hiring policy); Firefighters Inst. for Racial
Equality v. City of St. Louis, 588 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1978) (discriminatory test), vacated, 616 F.2d
350 (8th Cir. 1980); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (pattern of discrim-
ination), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 553 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y.)
(facially discriminatory pension plan), on remand from 672 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1982).
18. A formal, unwritten policy is one in which the employer communicates orally or by
means other than the normal channels for disseminating a policy. See Serpe v. Four-Phase Sys.,
718 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1983); Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 581 F. Supp. 1570, 1575
(S.D. Tex. 1984), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986).
This Article focuses on a single employment policy that is alleged to be discriminatory under
the disparate treatment or adverse impact theories of discrimination. It does not discuss "pattern
and practice" cases in which a plaintiff proves discrimination by showing that use of several em-
ployment policies has created a pattern of discrimination against a protected group. These cases
are analyzed under standards established in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977). See infra notes 42, 113 and accompanying text for a discussion of Teamsters.
19. Although the continuing violation theory in employment discrimination law usually is
discussed in the context of Title VII, it has been applied to other statutes prohibiting employment
discrimination as well. See Perez v. Laredo Junior College, 706 F.2d 731, 733 (5th Cir. 1983) (42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984); Home Ins. Co., 553 F. Supp. 710 (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967).
20. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
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finding in Fair Housing Act 21 cases that the discriminatory policy is the
continuing violation. The legislative history and court interpretations of
Title VII, discussed in Part IV, show that this approach should be ap-
plied in Title VII cases. Part V concludes that a challenge to a policy of
discrimination should be considered timely as long as the policy exists
and the plaintiff remains subject to the policy.22 The statute of limita-
tions should not begin to run until an employee subject to the policy
resigns or is discharged, or until the policy is discontinued .2  For pro-
spective employees rejected from a job or deterred from applying for a
job because of a discriminatory hiring policy, a charge should be consid-
ered timely as long as the policy exists.24 The statute of limitations for
these claims should not begin to run until the policy is discontinued.
II. UNITED AIR LinEs, INC. V. EvANs
In Evans, United Air Lines hired the plaintiff, Carolyn Evans, as a
flight attendant in 1966. She resigned in 1968 because of United's no-
marriage policy for female flight attendants, but she did not file a
charge of discrimination within ninety days of her resignation.25 United
Air Lines rehired Evans as a new employee in 1972. During the period
between Evans' resignation and rehiring, United abandoned its no-mar-
riage policy. When the company rehired Evans, it did not give her
credit for her prior seniority with United. According to company policy,
employees who severed their ties with United for any reason began as
new employees for purposes of calculating their seniority. Evans filed a
charge of discrimination in 1973, one year after she was rehired, alleging
that United's seniority system was a present, continuing violation for
two reasons: First, because of her unlawful discharge in 1968, men hired
between 1968 and 1972 had achieved greater seniority than she; 6 and
second, the seniority system perpetuated the past discrimination
against her.27
The Supreme Court stated that the issue was whether United was
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982).
22. Cf. Jackson & Matheson, supra note 2, at 828 (supporting liberalization of the statutory
filing requirement to effectuate elimination of discriminatory employment policy); Laycock, Con-
tinuing Violations, Disparate Impact in Compensation, and Other Title VII Issues, 49 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROns., Autumn 1986, at 53, 59 (recognizing a discriminatory policy as an ongoing viola-
tion causing harm to plaintiff); M. ZIMMR, C. SULLIVAN & R. RICHARDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 385-88 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
23. M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RICHARDS, supra note 22, at 385-88.
24. Id.
25. Before Congress amended Title VII in 1982, the statute of limitations was 90 days. Pub.
L. No. 88-352, § 706(d), 78 Stat. 260 (1964).
26. Evans, 431 U.S. at 557.
27. Id.
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committing a second violation by failing to credit Evans with her pre-
1972 seniority."s The alleged second violation was the present effect on
Evans of the time-barred act of discrimination. The Court held that
Evans' challenge to her 1968 discharge was time barred. First, the Court
stated that the seniority system was an intervening neutral policy that
treated all previously terminated employees alike, regardless of why the
employees had severed their ties with United.29 Although the system
did perpetuate United's past discrimination against Evans, her failure
to file a timely charge in 1968 allowed United to treat the past discrimi-
natory discharge as lawful, and to ignore the present effects of the se-
niority system on her pay and fringe benefits.30 Because no proof
existed that the neutral policy (i.e., the seniority system) currently was
being applied in a discriminatory manner, Evans could not allege that
the neutral policy violated Title VII. The Court explained that "the
critical question is whether any present violation exists.
31
The Court's second basis for rejecting Evans' charge was that the
present effects of past discrimination theory could not be used to invali-
date a bona fide seniority system.3 2 This reasoning affirmed the Court's
holding in the companion case of International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. United States,3 a case interpreting section 703(h) of Title VII.
Section 703(h) immunizes bona fide seniority systems from a charge of
discrimination.3 4 The issue in Teamsters was whether a seniority sys-
tem that perpetuates hiring discrimination, which occurred prior to the
effective date of Title VII, is a bona fide seniority system. The Court
held that "an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not
become unlawful . . . because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimina-
tion. '3 5 The Court in Teamsters further held that a seniority system is
28. Id. at 554.
29. Id. at 557-58.
30. Id. at 558. The Court stated:
A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of
a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was passed. It may constitute relevant
background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current practice is at issue, but
separately considered, it is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal
consequences.
Id.
31. Id. (emphasis in original).
32. Id. at 560.
33. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982). Section 703(h) states, in part:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different stan-
dards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant
to a bona fide seniority. . . system. . . provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . ...
35. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 353-54.
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bona fide unless the employer or union adopted or maintained the sys-
tem for a discriminatory purpose.36 In Evans the Court stated that the
plaintiff provided no proof that United's seniority system was not bona
fide.3 7 Evans also clarified that the section 703(h) exception applied to
discrimination that occurred both before and after the effective date of
Title VII, as long as it was perpetuated by a bona fide seniority
system.3 8
Evans resolved one jurisdictional issue related to the continuing vi-
olation theory: A neutral seniority system that perpetuates the effects
of past discrimination is neither a present nor a continuing violation of
Title VII. Most lower courts have interpreted this holding to apply to
other employment practices as well as seniority systems.3 9 Thus, lower
36. Id. at 356.
37. Evans, 431 U.S. at 560.
38. Id.
39. See B. SCHLEi & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 1046-47. The present effects of past dis-
crimination theory was used both as a procedural theory to extend the time limitations for filing a
charge of discrimination and as a substantive theory of discrimination. As a procedural theory, it
included present effects of past discrimination that were not perpetuated through a neutral em-
ployment device. In Jewett v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 653 F.2d 89 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 969 (1981), for example, the Third Circuit held that a delay caused by
psychological reactions to a discriminatory act was not a defense to not filing a timely charge, but
instead was nonactionable present effects of past discrimination. In situations in which past dis-
crimination was perpetuated through a neutral employment device, the present effects theory was
referred to both as a procedural theory for extending the limitations period and as a substantive
theory of discrimination. Although most courts hold that Evans applied to any neutral employ-
ment device, there is still disagreement over whether the present effects of past discrimination
theory is extinct. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), asserting that Evans
held that discharges are not continuing violations, considers the theory to be applicable to neutral
employment practices other than seniority systems that perpetuate past discrimination. EEOC
Compl. Man. (CCH) T9 2075, 2102 (Apr. 1985); see also Roberts v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 650
F.2d 823, 827 (6th Cir. 1981).
In a 1986 case in which the Supreme Court addressed the continuing violation theory,
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986), the issue of whether the present effects of past discrimi-
nation theory still is applicable to neutral employment devices other than seniority systems was
raised again. In Bazemore several black extension agents at the University of North Carolina's
Agricultural Extension Service, which is part of the state's extension program, alleged race dis-
crimination in compensation. Prior to 1965, the effective date of Title VII's application to private
employers, the Extension Service divided extension personnel into black and white branches, with
employees in the black branch being paid a lower salary than those in the white branch despite
performing the same jobs. These branches were merged prospectively in 1965, but the salary dis-
parities were never eliminated completely for those blacks who were hired when the branches were
segregated. Thus, the salary disparaties continued to exist after the 1972 amendments extending
Title VII coverage to state and local governments. The University of North Carolina argued that
the plaintiffs' claims of salary discrimination were nonactionable present effects of past discrimina-
tion. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision on this issue, held that the continuing salary
disparities were a present violation of Title VII.
Bazemore can be interpreted two ways. First, the Court was stating that paying disparate
salaries within the actionable period is intentional disparate treatment, regardless of when the
salary disparities began. Second, the fact that the new salary structure continued the effects of
past discrimination may mean that a neutral employment device that perpetuates the effects of
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1171
courts generally hold that present effects of past discrimination are
neither a present nor a continuing violation of Title VII, even when a
neutral employment device or practice perpetuates that past discrimi-
nation.40 An actionable charge of discrimination must be based on iden-
tifying an act or policy of discrimination that directly discriminates
within the statute of limitations period.41 Proof of a discriminatory pol-
icy existing within the statute of limitations period can be based on
either of the two major substantive theories of discrimination in Title
VII law: The adverse impact theory or the disparate treatment theory.42
The Court in Evans considered a single act pursuant to a policy of
discrimination, 4' but failed to resolve a second jurisdictional issue:
What constitutes timely filing in systemic discrimination cases. The
Court held that Evans' charge was time barred because she did not file
it within ninety days of her discharge, but the Court did not consider
whether or when she could have challenged the policy during her origi-
nal employment with United. Evans possibly could have fied a charge
past discrimination is still actionable discrimination. For a discussion of Bazemore, see Florida v.
Long, 108 S. Ct. 2354, 2364, 2368-69 (1988); Case Comment, Bazemore v. Friday: Salary Discrimi-
nation Under Title VII, 99 HARv. L. REv. 655 (1986); Expansion of Continuing Violation Theory,
122 Lab. Rel. Rep. Analysis (BNA) 41, 41-44 (July 14, 1986).
40. See generally A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 3, § 48.13(g)(1)-(5) (containing a dis-
cussion of application of the continuing violation theory to specific employment policies).
41. Evans, 431 U.S. at 558; see also Carty, The Continuing Violation Theory of Title VII
After United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 929, 935 (1980).
42. Under the adverse impact theory, established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), a neutral employment policy, such as a testing or weightlifting requirement for promotions,
is discriminatory if it has a disproportionate adverse effect on a group's employment opportunities
and is not job related. Proof of past discrimination is not necessary to establish a present violation.
Plaintiffs only have to show that a current employment policy has an adverse impact on a pro-
tected group.
The second substantive theory of discrimination, disparate treatment, is used to prove inten-
tional discrimination. Plaintiffs can prove either individual disparate treatment or systemic dispa-
rate treatment. When a present violation under the systemic disparate treatment theory is based
on proving the existence of a pattern or a practice of discrimination, the burden of proof estab-
lished in the Supreme Court's decision in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), is used to prove the violation. In Teamsters the Court held that the
plaintiff's burden is "to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that.., discrimination was
the company's standard operating procedure." Id. at 336. Statistics alone may prove the existence
of the pattern and practice of intentional discrimination; statistics combined with anecdotal evi-
dence can provide this proof as well. Id. at 339. When a formal policy already exists, existence of
the policy can provide the requisite proof of intent if the policy is facially discriminatory. When
the formal policy is apparently neutral, any relevant evidence tending to prove intent is admissi-
ble, including statistical evidence of the effects of the policy and testimonial or documentary evi-
dence on the origins of the policy. Cf. United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16
(1983). See infra note 116 for a discussion of the individual disparate treatment theory of
discrimination.
43. See Carty, supra note 41, at 947-52; Jackson & Matheson, supra note 2, at 826; see also
In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings, 582 F.2d 1142, 1148 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
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at other times. She could have filed within ninety days of being hired,
at any time between her hiring and her discharge, or within ninety days
of another employee's discharge under the policy. While Evans held
that discharges pursuant to a policy of discrimination are not continu-
ing violations,44 the case did not address the issue of whether Evans
could have challenged the policy at any other time.
III. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND CONTINUING VIOLATIONS
Conflict over timely filing in the employment context is due to the
failure of courts to develop a rationale and a legal standard for inter-
preting statutes of limitations with respect to systemic discrimination.
In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,45 a case brought under the Fair
Housing Act,48 the Supreme Court defined the violation in systemic dis-
crimination cases as the policy of discrimination itself and referred to
the continuing existence of the policy as a continuing violation of the
Fair Housing Act.4 7 The Court then interpreted the statute of limita-
tions in light of the continuing violation. The Court's rationale for this
construction was that it effectuated the remedial purpose of the Fair
Housing Act: eliminating systemic discrimination.48 Based on this ra-
tionale for interpreting the statute of limitations, the Court held that
an individual victim of housing discrimination could file a complaint of
discrimination within 180 days of an "asserted occurrence" of the dis-
criminatory policy, regardless of whether the individual filing the com-
plaint had suffered specific injury prior to the statute of limitations
period.49
In Havens, three individual plaintiffs and a housing counseling and
referral service filed individual and class action complaints against
Havens Realty, alleging that Havens Realty violated the Fair Housing
Act by engaging in racial steering. 0 Two of the plaintiffs were "tester"
plaintiffs (one black and one white), and one was a renter plaintiff (a
black male). Each sought housing through Havens Realty. The corpo-
rate plaintiff, Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME), organized
the testers' activities. When the tester plaintiffs inquired about housing
at the two apartment units operated by Havens Realty, the black tester
44. See Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1985).
45. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982).
47. Havens, 455 U.S. at 380.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 380-81.
50. Plaintiffs described racial steering as the practice of deliberately referring prospective
buyers or renters to neighborhoods or buildings based on their race or ethnicity in order to pre-
serve the racial or ethnic character of the neighborhood or building. Id. at 366 n.1.
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plaintiff was told that no apartments were available; the white tester
was told that some were available. The black renter plaintiff also was
told that no apartments were available. A total of five specific alleged
incidents of racial steering occurred. All three individual plaintiffs and
HOME alleged that Havens Realty's policy of racial steering deprived
them of the benefits that result from living in an interracial
neighborhood.
Section 3612(a) of the Fair Housing Act requires that a civil action
alleging discrimination under the Act be filed within 180 days "after the
alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred."51 All three plaintiffs
and HOME filed complaints of discrimination, but only the renter
plaintiff filed his complaint within 180 days of being denied housing.
Thus, because the four other alleged incidents of housing discrimina-
tion occurred prior to the incident involving the renter plaintiff, they
occurred prior to the 180-day statute of limitations period. The district
court granted Havens Realty's motion to dismiss the claims of the tes-
ter plaintiffs because they did not file their complaints within 180 days
of the unlawful housing practice. 2 HOME and the tester plaintiffs ap-
pealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
One of the issues on appeal concerned the definition of "occurrence" for
purposes of interpreting the statute of limitations.53 Havens Realty ar-
gued that each discrete act of alleged housing discrimination was an
occurrence, and that the tester plaintiffs did not file charges within 180
days of each act. 4 The plaintiffs argued that the occurrence under the
statute was Havens Realty's practice of racial steering, and that a
charge was timely if it was fied within 180 days of the last act of dis-
crimination pursuant to the practice.55 According to the plaintiffs, the
last act pursuant to the practice occurred when the renter plaintiff was
denied housing.56
The Fourth Circuit adopted the plaintiffs' definition that the oc-
currence under the statute was the alleged practice of racial steering.57
The court considered this interpretation to be consistent with the Fair
Housing Act's remedial goal of eliminating systemic discrimination.5 s
51. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1982).
52. Coles v. Havens Realty Corp., 633 F.2d 384, 385 (4th Cir. 1980), modified, 455 U.S. 363
(1982).
53. Coles, 633 F.2d at 391.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 391-92.
58. Id. at 392-93. The court stated:
There is an appealing simplicity equating "occurrence" to a discrete act. Not simple, however,
are the social ills targeted by Congress or the actions of putative landlords. It is not isolated
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Because the policy continued to occur within the limitations period, the
Fourth Circuit held that anyone subject to the policy could file a charge
challenging the policy within 180 days of an asserted occurrence of the
policy, regardless of when a particular individual was injured by the
policy.59
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of
the statute of limitations. The Court held that the testers' claims that
they were denied the benefits of interracial association were not time
barred, but were part of the racial steering claim that constituted the
continuing violation.60 The Court reasoned that continuing violations of
the Fair Housing Act warranted treatment different from isolated acts
of discrimination. In order to fulfill the "broad remedial intent" of Con-
gress in enacting the Fair Housing Act, the Court held that a claim for
a continuing violation is timely when filed "within 180 days of the last
asserted occurrence of that practice."6'
Havens resolved several issues relevant to interpreting the statute
of limitations in complaints alleging systemic discrimination. First, ac-
cording to Havens, the discriminatory policy (referred to as a "practice"
in Havens) is characterized as the alleged occurrence. In fact, the Court
predicated its interpretation of the statute of limitations on the exis-
instances of discrimination that are the primary focus of the statute-rather it is a genera-
lized practice of housing discrimination.
* * By the very nature of these offenses, "occurrence" must be thus construed to effect
the remedial purposes of the Act.
Id.
59. Id. at 393.
60. Havens, 455 U.S. at 381. The black tester plaintiff also alleged a violation based on lack
of truthful housing information, a violation of § 3604 of the Fair Housing Act. Id. The Court held
that this claim was not related to the racial steering claims and, thus, was not part of the continu-
ing violation. Id. at 381-82.
61. Id. at 380-81. The Court stated:
[A] "continuing violation" of the Fair Housing Act should be treated differently from one
discrete act of discrimination. Statutes of limitations such as that contained in [3612(a)] are
intended to keep stale claims out of the courts . . . . Where the challenged violation is a
continuing one, the staleness concern disappears. Petitioners' wooden application of [3612(a)],
which ignores the continuing nature of the alleged violation, only undermines the broad reme-
dial intent of Congress embodied in the Act. . .. [W]here a plaintiff, pursuant to the Fair
Housing Act, challenges not just one incident of conduct violative of the Act, but an unlawful
practice that continues into the limitations period, the complaint is timely when it is filed
within 180 days of the last asserted occurrence of that practice.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted). In Havens the Court cited Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455
U.S. 385 (1982), a Title VII case decided the same day, to support its reasoning that limitations
periods in discrimination statutes should be interpreted liberally in order to effectuate the broad
remedial intent of Congress to eliminate discrimination. Havens, 455 U.S. at 380. Zipes held that
Title VII's limitations period is not jurisdictional, which would require a court to dismiss an un-
timely charge, but instead is like a statute of limitations, which allows a court to accept equitable
defenses to untimely filed charges. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393.
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tence of an alleged policy of discrimination. Second, the fact that a
plaintiff's injury occurred prior to the statute of limitations period does
not preclude that plaintiff from challenging the policy of discrimina-
tion. Third, the statute of limitations must be interpreted in a manner
consistent with eliminating a continuing violation. The rationale for
construing the policy of discrimination as the alleged occurrence and
interpreting the statute of limitations consistent with that construction
is that the Fair Housing Act's remedial goal of eliminating systemic dis-
crimination is effectuated. Based on the Court's definition of an occur-
rence, a plaintiff alleging systemic housing discrimination could file a
complaint of discrimination within 180 days of an asserted occurrence
of the discriminatory housing policy. Whether this asserted occurrence
standard is applicable to Title VII law depends upon whether it effectu-
ates Title VII's remedial goals.
IV. TITLE VII AND CONTINUING VIOLATIONS
A. Legislative Debate on Title VII
The legal definition of the violation in Havens as well as the ration-
ale for that definition should apply to employment discrimination law
as well, because the elimination of systemic discrimination is also a spe-
cific goal in employment discrimination law. During the 1972 congres-
sional debates over amendments to Title VII, Congress repeatedly
acknowledged its inability to calculate the extent and nature of discrim-
ination.2 The original Title VII, enacted in 1964, contemplated that
most charges of discrimination would involve single acts of discrimina-
tion against a specific individual.0 3 Congress believed that most charges
of discrimination would be enforced through conciliation. 4 The two
other methods of enforcement-pattern and practice suits filed by the
Attorney General of the United States6 5 and litigation by private par-
62. See generally H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-11 (1972) [hereinafter H.R. REP.
No. 238], reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AcT OF 1972,
at 61-71 [hereinafter 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-8 (1971)
[hereinafter S. REP. No. 415], reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 410-17.
63. H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 62, at 8, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 62, at 68.
64. Id.
65. Under the original version of Title VII, Congress did not give the EEOC the power to sue
in federal court to enforce Title VII. The EEOC only had authority to conciliate or to use other
informal methods to resolve those charges when it concluded that reasonable cause existed that
discrimination had occurred. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 241,
259 (1964). Only private plaintiffs and the Attorney General were given the authority to file law-
suits. Id. § 706(e), at 260. Section 707(a) of the original Act gave the Attorney General the author-
ity to file a civil action when he "has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of
persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights
secured by [Title VH] .... Id. § 707(a), at 261. The 1972 amendments gave EEOC the authority
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ties-were not considered to be the primary enforcement tools.6 Later
experience with Title VII, however, indicated that systemic discrimina-
tion was a major problem.
Litigation by private plaintiffs as well as conciliation attempts by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency
created to enforce Title VII, revealed a lack of understanding about the
systemic nature of discrimination.6 7 The EEOC's ability to deal with
issues of systemic discrimination in part led to proposed legislation giv-
ing the agency cease and desist powers.6 8 Although this proposal was
defeated, Congress did give the agency the power to file lawsuits on
behalf of aggrieved individuals and to file pattern and practice suits,
partly for the purpose of eliminating systemic discrimination. 9
Congress also recognized the critical role played by private plain-
tiffs in eliminating systemic discrimination through the use of class ac-
tion lawsuits.70 The conference report on the final amendments to Title
VII specifically stated that the new amendment giving EEOC the power
to file suit in federal court did not prevent the use of class actions."1
The report noted that "the leading cases . . . have recognized that
many Title VII claims are necessarily class action complaints. '"7 Thus,
Congress specifically endorsed the use of class actions to end systemic
discrimination.
In addition to addressing concerns about systemic discrimination,
Congress in 1972 also supported a liberal interpretation of the statute
of limitations period in Title VII and endorsed the continuing violation
theory. According to the Senate Report to amended Title VII, the stat-
ute of limitations begins to run at the time of the last occurrence of
discrimination. The Report endorsed other liberal interpretations of the
to initiate a lawsuit on behalf of an aggrieved party and to file pattern and practice suits against
private employers. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(g)(6), 2000e-6(c) (1982).
66. H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 62, at 8, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 62, at 68.
67. Id. The House Report on the proposed amendments to Title VII stated:
[In 1964] employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and distin-
guishable events, due, for the most part, to ill-will on the part of some identifiable individual
or organization ...
Employment discrimination, as we know today, is a far more complex and pervasive phe-
nomenon. Experts familiar with the subject generally describe the problem in terms of "sys-
tems" and "effects" rather than simply intentional wrongs.
Id.
68. Id. at 10, 27, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 62, at 70, 87.
69. Id. at 14, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 62, at 74.
70. E.g., 117 CONG. REC. H32,096-97 (1971) (statement of Rep. Abzug), reprinted in 1972
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 62, at 276.
71. S. CONe. RaP. No. 899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (March 6, 1972) [hereinafter S. CONF. REP.
No. 899], reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 62, at 1847.
72. Id.
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continuing violation theory and counseled the courts to construe Title
VII broadly so as not to deny claims because of "procedural oversight"
or government delay.7" The Report's specific reference to the limita-
tions period as requiring an "occurrence" of discrimination raises but
does not resolve the issue presented in this Article. In early cases in-
volving a series of single acts of discrimination against an individual
plaintiff, the continuing violation theory always required that a specific
act injure the plaintiff within the limitations period.74 Thus, an occur-
rence referred to an act of discrimination directed at a single individual.
Litigation challenging discriminatory policies, however, was treated
differently.
B. Court Interpretations of Timeliness Under Title VII
Although many of the pre-1972 continuing violation cases con-
cerned single acts of discrimination, some concerned systemic discrimi-
nation. In the systemic discrimination cases, some courts did not
require that a specific act injure the plaintiff within the limitations pe-
riod.75 These courts construed the discriminatory policy as the occur-
rence. For example, in King v. Georgia Power Co.,7 6 a pre-amendment
case, black employees in a class action complaint alleged discrimination
based on promotions, testing, and segregated facilities. The employer
argued that the charge was not timely because the employees did not
allege that they had filed a charge within ninety days of the alleged
unlawful employment practice. The district court held that failure to
make such an allegation does not deprive a court of jurisdiction over
the claim because the alleged violations were "continuing acts. ' '77 Simi-
73. Id. at 25, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 62, at 1846. Title VII as
amended extended the limitations period for filing a charge of discrimination from 90 to 180 days.
The Senate Report to the amended Act stated:
Existing case law which was [sic] determined that certain types of violations are continuing in
nature, thereby measuring the running of the required time period from the last occurrence of
the discrimination and not from the first occurrence is continued, and other interpretations of
the courts maximizing the coverage of the law are not affected. It is intended by expanding
the time period for filing charges ... that aggrieved individuals, who frequently are un-
trained laymen and who are not always aware of the discrimination which is practiced against
them, should be given a greater opportunity to prepare their charges and file their complaints
and that existent but undiscovered acts of discrimination should not escape the effect of the
law through a procedural oversight. Moreover, wide latitude should be given individuals in
such cases to avoid any prejudice to their rights as a result of government inadvertence, delay
or error.
Id.
74. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 1047-48.
75. Id. at 1050. But see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 236 (Supp. 1983-1984)
(discussing recent developments).
76. 295 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
77. Id. at 946.
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larly, in Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 8 a 1971 case, the Seventh
Circuit held that a facially discriminatory pension plan that discrimi-
nated on the basis of sex was a continuing violation for which charges
were timely as long as the plan existed. Cases in which the existence of
a discriminatory policy served as the basis for a charge of discrimina-
tion are consistent with the Senate Report's endorsement of case law
that granted plaintiffs "maximum coverage under the law" when they
filed charges of discrimination. 9 A 1980 Supreme Court decision 0 and
judicial concern about interpreting the statute of limitations too expan-
sively, however, have caused considerable conflict over the appropriate
standard for timely filing in systemic discrimination cases.
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman supports the view that resolving
the issue of timely filing in charges that allege systemic discrimination
requires balancing the substantive goals of the applicable statute and
the procedural provisions designed to achieve those goals. When conflict
arises over interpretation of a procedural provision, one should adopt
an interpretation that furthers the statute's substantive goals, because
any specific procedural provision of an act should be interpreted in the
context of the act's overall purpose.81 The elimination of systemic dis-
crimination is a specific goal of Title VII. When plaintiffs have filed
charges alleging systemic employment discrimination, however, some
courts have failed to analyze the issue of timeliness in light of this goal.
These courts, instead, have interpreted narrowly the statute of limita-
tions in Title VII and have required that an act stemming from the
discriminatory policy affect the plaintiff. These courts apply the date-
of-notification/injury standard.
1. Date-of-Notification/Injury Standard
Under the date-of-notification/injury standard, a charge of discrim-
ination must be filed within 180 days of a plaintiff's being notified of
the discriminatory policy or within 180 days of an action affecting the
plaintiff under the policy. This standard does not define the policy or
the continuing violation as the discriminatory "occurrence." Instead, it
defines an act pursuant to the policy that affects the plaintiff as the
discriminatory occurrence. Some courts that have adopted this ap-
proach have relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Delaware State
78. 444 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
79. Cf. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 236 (Supp. 1983-1984).
80. See infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of Delaware College v.
Ricks.
81. See generally Comment, Equitable Modification of Title VII Time Limitations to Pro-
mote the Statute's Remedial Nature: The Case for Maximum Application of the Zipes Rationale,
18 U.C. DAvis L. Rzv. 749 (1985) (authored by Kathryn Doi).
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College v. Rickss2 as precedent.
Under the standard introduced by the Court in Ricks, courts
should interpret narrowly the statute of limitations when a single act of
discrimination injures the plaintiff. In Ricks the plaintiff, a Liberian
college professor, was denied tenure in February 1973. A reconsidera-
tion of the decision in February 1974 affirmed the original denial, and
the College Board of Trustees upheld the decision in March 1974. In
June 1974 the Board of Trustees offered Ricks a terminal one-year con-
tract, which was to expire on June 30, 1975. Ricks signed the contract
in September 1974 and filed a grievance that same month. In April 1975
Ricks filed a charge of discrimination based on national origin. The dis-
trict court held that his claim was time barred because the alleged un-
lawful employment practice, the denial of tenure, had occurred more
than 180 days prior to the filing of the charge.83 Reversing the district
court,8 4 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the statute
of limitations did not begin to run until Ricks' one-year contract had
expired. 5
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court stated that the first inquiry is to "identify precisely the 'un-
lawful employment practice' of which [Ricks] complains." 6 The Court
found that the unlawful employment practice had occurred when Ricks
was notified that he was denied tenure, not when his contract was ter-
minated. 7 In response to Ricks' claim that he was suffering from a con-
tinuing violation until the date of his termination, the Court noted that
Ricks did not allege any acts of discrimination that could constitute a
continuing violation between the date he was notified that he was de-
nied tenure and the date of discharge.88 The Court stated that "[m]ere
continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the
life of a cause of action for employment discrimination." 9
The rationale for the Court's decision focused on the primary pol-
icy reason for a statute of limitations: To prevent litigation of stale
claims.90 If stale claims of discrimination are litigated, employers may
82. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
83. Id. at 254-55.
84. Id. at 255.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 257.
87. Id. at 258.
88. Id. at 257.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 256-57. The Court stated: "The limitations periods, while guaranteeing the protec-
tion of the civil rights laws to those who promptly assert their rights, also protect employers from
the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that are long past." Id. The
Court also held Ricks' charge to be untimely under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), another civil rights
statute.
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suffer prejudice from loss of relevant documents, inability to recall
dates and events, and unavailability of witnesses.91 In a later decision,
Chardon v. Fernandez,2 the Supreme Court affirmed the Ricks holding
that the date of notification of an alleged unlawful employment practice
begins the statute of limitations period.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted the date-of-
notification/injury standard in Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey De-
partment of Civil Service." In Bronze Shields, black and Hispanic
plaintiffs alleged that the eligibility roster promulgated and used to hire
police recruits for the Newark Police Department was discriminatory
because it was based on a test that had an adverse impact on black and
Hispanic applicants. The plaintiffs knew that they had failed the test in
May 1975, when the eligibility roster ranking employees based on the
test was published, but they did not file their charges within 180 days
of the roster's publication. Instead, they filed charges in July 1976,
more than one year after the eligibility roster had been published. The
City intended to use the roster as a basis for selecting new recruits for
three years. The Newark Police Department did not use the roster until
November 1977, more than one year after the plaintiffs fied their
charges. The district court held that the charges were untimely based
on its finding that the unlawful employment practice occurred in May
1975, with the promulgation of the roster."' The plaintiffs argued that
their charges were not time barred because the eligibility roster would
be used to select recruits for three years. 5 According to the plaintiffs,
the defendants' continued use of the results from a discriminatory test
was a continuing violation for which charges were timely as long as the
roster was in effect.9 6
Relying upon Ricks, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit af-
firmed the district court's holding that the charges were untimely. The
court stated that the Ricks decision required it to "'identify precisely
the "unlawful employment practice" of which [plaintiff] complains.' ",97
According to the court, the language of Title VII requires that a specific
act aggrieve the plaintiffs.98 The court stated that the only act which
aggrieved the plaintiffs was the promulgation of the eligibility roster.99
Because the plaintiffs did not file charges within 180 days of the roster's
91. See Brooks, McGinn & Cary, supra note 2, at 29.
92. 454 U.S. 6 (1981).
93. 667 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1982).
94. Id. at 1080.
95. Id. at 1081.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1083.
98. Id. at 1084.
99. Id.
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publication, the court held that the charges were time barred.100 The
court explained that the plaintiffs had not alleged that a specific act of
discrimination had occurred after the roster was published, such as an
allegation that selections from the neutral eligibility roster were made
on a discriminatory basis.101
The date-of-notification/injury standard is inconsistent with the le-
gal standard developed in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman. Under
Havens, if the plaintiff alleges that a policy of discrimination exists, the
policy, not a specific act, constitutes the alleged violation, and the stat-
ute of limitations should be interpreted in a manner consistent with
eliminating the policy. Courts following the date-of-notification/injury
standard, however, look for a specific act that affects the plaintiff and
consider that act to be the violation. Thus, a plaintiff must file a charge
within 180 days of the act. Courts focusing on a specific act that ag-
grieves the plaintiff ignore the alleged discriminatory policy that pro-
duced the act of discrimination, even though that policy will continue
to affect employment opportunities for the plaintiff and members of the
plaintiff's class. In Bronze Shields, for example, the court identified the
unlawful employment practice as the promulgation of the eligibility ros-
ter, not the unlawful test. Although the eligibility roster constituted no-
tice of the test results, the issue of whether the test was discriminatory
was never presented to the court. In fact, the Newark Police Depart-
ment later made hiring decisions based on the alleged discriminatory
test by selecting recruits from the eligibility roster after the plaintiffs
had filed charges.102 The plaintiffs had challenged the test in order to
eliminate the use of a discriminatory test at any time. Because the
court did not focus on the discriminatory policy, the plaintiffs were
barred for three years from being selected as police recruits based on an
alleged invalid selection procedure.103
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1083; cf. Zangrillo v. Fashion Inst. of Technology, 601 F. Supp. 1346 (S.D.N.Y.),
afl'd, 788 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1985). Although the Third Circuit relied upon Ricks in Bronze Shields,
its analysis paralleled Evans. The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs would have to show dispa-
rate treatment in selections from the eligibility roster in order for their charges to be timely. This
is similar to Evans' holding that past discrimination perpetuated by a neutral employment device
is not a present violation unless it is alleged that the neutral device is being applied in a discrimi-
natory manner, such as an allegation that the neutral seniority system treats males and females
differently. In Evans, however, the underlying policy that produced the discrimination (i.e., the no-
marriage policy) was eliminated. Thus, any effect from that past discriminatory policy that was not
timely challenged was a nonactionable present effect of past discrimination. In Bronze Shields, by
contrast, the underlying discriminatory policy continued to exist. Thus, the eligibility roster in
Bronze Shields was not a neutral device that perpetuated past discrimination. Instead, the roster
was promulgated and used pursuant to a present policy of discrimination.
102. Bronze Shields, 667 F.2d at 1083 n.23.
103. See id. at 1089-93 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
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In Bronze Shields the Third Circuit equated notice of the eligibil-
ity roster with notice of tenure denial in Ricks. The court, therefore,
implicitly concluded that the rationale of Ricks-to prevent litigation of
stale claims-also applied. The Ricks rationale, however, is inapplicable
to cases in which there exists a continuing violation based on an under-
lying policy of discrimination. In Ricks, a single act of discrimination
was directed at a specific individual. The notification of tenure denial
was the only alleged act of discrimination. In that situation, delay in
filing a charge of discrimination potentially could prejudice an employer
defending against a charge of discrimination. In Bronze Shields and
other cases involving alleged discriminatory policies, the policy that has
injured or could injure the plaintiff continues to exist. Thus, while a
specific act under the policy may have occurred prior to the limitations
period, the policy itself exists within the limitations period. Because the
policy exists within the limitations period, the employer will not be
prejudiced by a challenge to the policy, for the alleged violation is not
stale. 104
In another Third Circuit case applying the date-of-notification/in-
jury standard, EEOC v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., °5 the Court of
Appeals clarified its reasoning in Ricks by holding that Ricks did not
apply to continuing violations based on systemic discrimination. The
court still required, however, that the plaintiffs suffer actual injury
from the policy within the statute of limitations period before the court
would establish jurisdiction over the charge. In Westinghouse, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleged that Westing-
house's Layoff and Income Benefits Plan (LIB) violated the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA)106 because employees who
were fifty-five years or older were excluded from the plan. The plan
provided benefits to employees who were laid off for business reasons,
but employees who were eligible for early retirement were ineligible for
LIB benefits. Excluded from this plan, then, were most employees who
were fifty-five years of age or older, because they were eligible for early
retirement. Paul Meola, a Westinghouse employee who was laid off in
April 1977 because of a plant closing, was denied LIB benefits because
of his eligibility for early retirement. Meola filed a complaint of dis-
crimination that same month, alleging that the LIB plan violated the
ADEA. EEOC eventually initiated a suit on behalf of Meola in 1980,
and amended the complaint in February 1981 to include sixty-four
104. EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 553 F. Supp. 704, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Erdmann v. Board of
Educ., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1373, 1375 (D.N.J. 1982).
105. 725 F.2d 211, 218-20 (3d. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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other Westinghouse employees who were laid off in April 1977 under
similar circumstances. Between January and March 1977, Westinghouse
had notified all employees who eventually were laid off after the plant
closing about their ineligibility for the LIB plan.
Under the ADEA, plaintiffs must file a civil action within two years
of an alleged violation; the limitations period is extended to three years
for willful violations. 10 7 Relying on Ricks, the district court held that
only Meola's charge was filed timely; the charges filed by the other
sixty-four employees were time barred under the two or three year stat-
ute of limitations.108 The court found the discriminatory practice to be
the denial of LIB benefits and held that the notice to employees in
early 1977 constituted notice of that denial.' The Third Circuit re-
versed. The court stated that Ricks did not apply because it dealt with
"isolated instances of discrimination concluded in the past." 10 Instead,
the court accepted the plaintiffs' characterization of the policy as a con-
tinuing violation and stated that the issue concerned the accrual of a
cause of action for a continuing violation under ADEA's three year stat-
ute of limitations."" The court held that a cause of action did not ac-
crue until each plaintiff had been injured by the policy of denying LIB
claims to those eligible for early retirement." 2 The critical aspect of the
Westinghouse decision is the court's conclusion that an employee did
not have an enforceable demand until after she was denied LIB bene-
fits. Although the Third Circuit agreed that Ricks was inapplicable to
continuing violations, the court's requirement in Westinghouse that
each person be rejected under the LIB plan before filing a charge is as
inflexible as the Ricks standard.
If the date-of-notification standard can be criticized for foreclosing
too early a plaintiff's right to challenge a policy of discrimination,
107. The ADEA is enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This stat-
ute requires a plaintiff to file a charge of discrimination within 180 days of the alleged violation. 29
U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (1982). After filing a charge, a plaintiff has two years to file a civil suit. This
time period is extended to three years in cases of willful violations. Id. §§ 626(e)(1), 255(a).
108. Westinghouse, 725 F.2d at 216-17.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 218.
111. Id. at 218-20.
112. Id. at 219. The court stated:
A denial of LIB benefits could not occur until an employee was eligible to apply for LIB and
until the claim was denied due to eligibility for early retirement. An employee did not have
an enforceable demand until the claim was denied .... Although the alleged unlawful prac-
tice was the adoption and implementation of the policy, a cause of action could not accrue
until the discrimination manifested itself by virtue of the policy actually being applied to
individual employees at the time of the plant closing through individual LIB claim rejections.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court apparently concluded that the plaintiffs did
not have standing to challenge the policy until they were injured by it. Id. at 220. See infra note
157 for a discussion of standing.
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Westinghouse's use of the second part of the standard, date of injury,
can be criticized for granting too late the plaintiff's right to challenge
the policy. Under Westinghouse, an employee may have to wait years
before challenging an alleged discriminatory policy. If an employee
sought to challenge an alleged discriminatory retirement plan, for ex-
ample, she would have to challenge the plan upon notification of eligi-
bility for the plan, because the continuing existence of an alleged
discriminatory retirement plan is a continuing violation. Actual injury
under the plan, however, would not occur until the employee was eligi-
ble for retirement, perhaps ten to twenty years in the future. The con-
tinuing existence of an alleged discriminatory policy, therefore, could
produce low morale and productivity, for victims of discrimination suf-
fer psychological harm as well as economic detriment.
The existence of a discriminatory policy also can discourage an in-
dividual's pursuit of an employment opportunity, which makes it im-
possible for that individual to suffer direct injury from the policy. In
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States113 the Su-
preme Court held that black and Hispanic employees did not have to
prove that they had applied for a job to establish that they were the
victims of an employer's discriminatory hiring policy, because the exis-
tence of a discriminatory hiring policy might have deterred or discour-
aged employees from applying for the job.11 Other policies also can
have this effect. In Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine"' two plain-
tiffs alleged that Baylor College's policy of excluding Jews from a rota-
tional program that allowed doctors to practice medicine in Saudi
Arabia constituted religious discrimination. The college argued that the
plaintiffs had failed to prove that they had applied for the rotational
program."' The district court, citing Teamsters, stated that "where the
act of formal application would be futile, the fact that a plaintiff never
applied does not preclude recovery."117 No specific act of discrimination
that injures the plaintiff can occur in the case of facially discriminatory
policies, such as in Abrams, because the employer prevents the em-
113. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
114. Id. at 365-66.
115. 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 1984), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir.
1986).
116. Id. at 1578. The district court analyzed the plaintiffs' charges under the individual dis-
parate treatment theory of discrimination. Under this theory of discrimination, a plaintiff must
show that she applied for a job, was qualified, was denied the job despite her qualifications, and
that the employer continued to seek applicants with similar qualifications. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Courts have modified this standard based upon different
factual circumstances. In Abrams the district court stated that the plaintiffs would have applied
but for the overt discriminatory policy. 581 F. Supp. at 1579 (emphasis added). For an extended
discussion of Abrams, see infra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
117. 581 F. Supp. at 1578.
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ployee from pursuing an employment opportunity.118 The second stan-
dard, the manifestation/enforcement standard, avoids some, but not all,
of these problems.
2. Manifestation/Enforcement Standard
The manifestation/enforcement standard is a variation of the "as-
serted occurrence" standard developed in Havens Realty Corp. v. Cole-
man. This standard requires the plaintiff to file a charge of systemic
discrimination within 180 days of the discriminatory policy being mani-
fested or enforced against the plaintiff or against a member of the
plaintiff's class. For example, if a member of the plaintiff's class is de-
nied a promotion based on an alleged discriminatory promotion policy,
then the plaintiff can file a charge within 180 days of that promotion
denial. Similarly, if an employer makes an employment decision under
the policy without specifically rejecting a plaintiff or a member of the
plaintiff's class, such as promoting a nonclass member based on an un-
lawful test, this manifestation of the policy, if within the limitations
period, can be the basis for a charge. Allowing a plaintiff to file a charge
based on the enforcement of the policy against another or based on the
manifestation of the policy distinguishes this standard from the date-
of-notification/injury standard, for the latter standard requires that a
specific act under the policy injure the plaintiff. Abrams v. Baylor Col-
lege of Medicine119 and Guardians Association v. Civil Service Com-
mission illustrate the manifestation/enforcement approach. 120
In Abrams the Baylor College of Medicine provided cardiovascular
services for the King Faisal Hospital in Saudi Arabia. The school sent
teams of anesthesiologists and other personnel to Saudi Arabia every
three months. Because more pediatric cases exhibiting certain medical
diseases occurred in Saudi Arabia, doctors chosen for the rotation were
able to receive intensive clinical experience by handling these cases. Ad-
ditionally, salaries for the doctors who went to Saudi Arabia were twice
as much as those of the doctors who remained at Baylor. Application to
the program was informal. An interested doctor would inform one of
the program administrators of her interest. The administrator then
listed the doctor on a scheduling sheet and submitted her name to the
block entry visa program in order to facilitate entry into Saudi Arabia.
Abrams and Linde were Jewish doctors who were interested in par-
ticipating in the rotation program, but each was told by University or
program administrators that Jews were not allowed to participate in the
118. Cf. Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 613 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1980).
119. 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986).
120. 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
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program because of the problems in obtaining visas for them. Abrams
was informed of the policy a few days before he was hired in 1978.
Linde learned of the exclusion in 1980. Abrams and Linde filed their
charges of religious discrimination in 1982, more than 180 days after
each had been notified of the hospital's policy. Baylor argued that
Abrams' and Linde's charges were not timely. The district court, how-
ever, stated that the charges were filed timely, based on the theory that
any ongoing policy of discrimination is a continuing violation.121 The
court stated that sending out the rotation teams within 180 days of the
charges being filed was a manifestation of the continuing violation. 122
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first ex-
amined Abrams' and Linde's timeliness claims under equitable defenses
for extending the statute of limitations in order to determine why the
plaintiffs had not filed their charges when they were notified of the pol-
icy. The court stated that the filing period normally may" 'not begin to
run until facts supportive of a Title VII charge or civil rights action are
or should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person similarly situ-
ated.' "113 The court stated further that an unlawful employment prac-
tice that manifests itself over time is a continuing violation that
"'relieves a plaintiff who makes such a claim from the burden of prov-
ing that the entire violation occurred within the actionable period.' "124
After accepting an equitable defense to the plaintiffs' failure to chal-
lenge the policy upon notification, the court held that the charges were
timely based on its interpretation of the continuing violation theory. In
discussing the theory, the Fifth Circuit did not accept the argument
that any ongoing policy of discrimination can be the basis for a timely
filing.125 Instead, the court stated that there must be "some application
of the illegal policy to [the plaintiff] (or to his class) within the 180 days
preceding the filing of his complaint. 12' 6 The court stated that an ex-
121. Abrams, 805 F.2d at 531-32.
122. Id. at 534.
123. Id. at 532 (quoting Glass v. Petro-Tex Chem. Corp., 757 F.2d 1554, 1560 (5th Cir.
1985)).
124. 805 F.2d at 532-33 (quoting Berry v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 715 F.2d
971, 979 (5th Cir. 1983)). The court reached the illogical conclusion that the hospital's failure to
verify the policy with the Saudi Government obscured the existence of the policy. It interpreted
the oral communications regarding the policy as single acts of discrimination. The plaintiffs, how-
ever, were told repeatedly by administrators of the program that Jews were not allowed to partici-
pate in the rotation program. That was the official position and policy of Baylor Hospital,
regardless of the position of the Saudi Government. The Fifth Circuit reached the conclusion that
failure to verify the policy obscured the existence of the policy in order to avoid the harsh and
unfair conclusion that plaintiffs' actions otherwise would have been time barred. For a discussion
of the ongoing policy standard, see infra notes 138-57.
125. 805 F.2d at 533.
126. Id.; cf. Gonzalez v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 610 F.2d 241, 249 (5th Cir. 1980) (stat-
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pansive reading of the continuing violation theory "would... read the
statute of limitations right out of existence.' 1 7 Because the school had
sent out a rotation team within the limitations period, however, the
Fifth Circuit held that this manifestation of the policy rendered the
charges timely."28
In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission,29 the Sec-
ond Circuit applied the manifestation/enforcement standard to a dis-
criminatory hiring examination. The plaintiffs alleged that a test given
for hiring entry level recruits for the police department had an adverse
impact on blacks and Hispanics. Although the test was administered
and the eligibility list was promulgated prior to the 1972 amendments
extending Title VII to state and local jurisdictions, the eligibility list
was used until October 1974. The plaintiffs filed their charges within six
months of October 1974. The Court of Appeals stated that continuing
to use the results from a discriminatory test was a continuing violation,
regardless of when the test was instituted. 30 Such a discriminatory pol-
icy did not end until the employer stopped hiring based on the discrim-
inatory test.'' Because a discriminatory policy did exist, the court
stated that "the timeliness of a complaint filed as to such a policy is
measured from the last occurrence of an instance of that policy."'3 2
Thus, the plaintiffs were not required to file their charges within 180
days of notification of their test results, but within 180 days of the em-
ployer's last selection from the eligibility list.
The manifestation/enforcement standard does effectuate Title
VII's goal of eliminating systemic discrimination. Under this standard
courts consider the nature of the violation and interpret the statute of
limitations in light of that violation. Because a discriminatory policy is
being challenged, a plaintiff may fie a charge based on injury to an-
other person in the plaintiff's class or on some other manifestation of
the policy. This standard's deficiencies, however, appear to outweigh its
merits. Like the notification/injury standard, under this standard chal-
lenges to some discriminatory employment policies might be delayed
for several years. For example, in the case of eligibility lists derived
from an alleged discriminatory test, a plaintiff would have to wait until
selections were made from the list before filing a charge, an event that
ing that "a timely charge can be based on administration of the test during the limitations period
or denial of a promotion during the limitations period based on preliminary administration of the
test").
127. Abrams, 805 F.2d at 534.
128. Id.
129. 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980).
130. Id. at 249.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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may not occur for more than a year with a list that is effective for three
or four years. Such a delay could produce economic detriment as well as
low morale and productivity. The manifestation/enforcement standard
has two additional deficiencies. First, it does not consider the exclusion-
ary effects of systemic discrimination on those discriminated against.
Second, the standard unfairly requires a single employee to have exten-
sive knowledge of an employer's business operation.
Systemic discrimination can foreclose a group's knowledge of and
participation in an employer's personnel processes. Because of this ex-
clusion, the victim of discrimination is not always aware of when a spe-
cific decision occurs pursuant to an alleged discriminatory policy. In
Domingo v. New England Fish Co.13' minority employees alleged that
the company discriminated in hiring and promotions. The company re-
cruited by word of mouth for most of the higher paying skilled jobs and
for clerical and technical jobs. Minority employees were unable to learn
of the job openings because most of these jobs were held by whites and
the work environment was segregated; thus, the employer's discrimina-
tory system was effective in preventing minority participation in the job
information network. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that using separate job channels in recruiting for higher skilled jobs,
coupled with other evidence, constituted intentional discrimination.1 3 4
Other hiring and promotion policies, such as nepotism, race- or sex-seg-
regated departments, and promotions based on supervisory recommen-
dations, could produce a similar result.3 5 In these circumstances, to
require one to show some manifestation or enforcement of a discrimina-
tory policy would be futile when the policy effectively has precluded
participation in the job information network.
The second reason that the manifestation/enforcement standard
should not be applied is that it unfairly places the burden of challeng-
ing a discriminatory policy on the plaintiff. In large companies, those
employees affected by the policy might work in different departments
or plants. Because of the expansive business environment in which the
policy could be applied, a plaintiff likely will not know when it is being
enforced. In individual disparate treatment cases, a plaintiff is expected
to know when she was denied a job or a promotion because the decision
usually is communicated directly to the individual, or since only one
isolated employment decision has been made, the plaintiff easily can
ascertain detailed information about the decision. When a employer en-
acts a policy that affects hundreds or thousands of persons working in
133. 727 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 742 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1984).
134. 727 F.2d at 1436.
135. See B. SCHLEI & P. GRossMAN, supra note 3, at 191-205, 573-74.
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different departments or plants, however, the policy could be enforced
or manifested against anyone at the company, and a plaintiff seeking to
challenge the policy is not necessarily aware of the enforcement or man-
ifestation. In Abrams, for example, Abrams was transferred, over his
objections, from the hospital that supplied most of the doctors included
in the rotation program to another hospital, increasing the possibility
that he would be unaware of decisions regarding selections for the rota-
tion team. 3 6 Similarly, in Bronze Shields, the plaintiffs would be re-
quired to know when selections from the eligibility roster were made,
even though the City's failure to hire them meant that they likely
would not be aware of internal personnel decisions.13 7 The ongoing pol-
icy standard does not have these deficiencies because its primary focus
is the nature of the violation.
3. Ongoing Policy Standard
Under the ongoing policy standard, a person subject to an alleged
discriminatory policy may file a charge at any time during the policy's
existence. A cause of action under this standard does not accrue until a
person no longer is subject to the policy. This standard is distinguisha-
ble from the prior standards in that it does not require the occurrence
of any specific act under the policy before a plaintiff who is subject to
the policy may challenge it. Roberts v. North American Rockwell
Corp.3M and EEOC v. Home Insurance Co.139 are examples of this
standard.
In Roberts plaintiff Roberts applied for a job with North American
Rockwell through the Winchester, Kentucky Unemployment Office.
The office refused to give her an employment application, informing her
that North American Rockwell did not hire women. Roberts then sent
her son-in-law into the office to obtain an application. After he obtained
one, she filled it out and mailed it to North American Rockwell in De-
cember 1972. Between December 1972 and August 1973, Roberts peri-
odically inquired about her application at the unemployment office, but
she was told repeatedly that the company did not hire women. In Sep-
tember 1973 Roberts and two other women went to the unemployment
office to fill out applications for jobs at North American Rockwell, but
all the women were refused applications. After complaining to the local
human rights commission, the women finally received applications, but
Roberts did not fill hers out because she already had one on file.
136. 805 F.2d at 531.
137. See Bronze Shields, 667 F.2d at 1093 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
138. 650 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1981).
139. 553 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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Roberts filed a charge of sex discrimination in hiring on September
17, 1973. The district court held that her charge was time barred be-
cause she did not file it within 180 days of December 1972, when she
first mailed her application to the company. 140 The Sixth Circuit re-
versed, holding that an ongoing policy of hiring discrimination is a con-
tinuing violation. The court argued that a continuing policy of
discrimination would result in the automatic rejection of applicants be-
cause of race, sex, or national origin. In that circumstance, the court
found no reason for an applicant "to continuously apply, only to be
continuously rejected.'' 14 1
In EEOC v. Home Insurance Co., 42 the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission alleged that Home Insurance Company's policy of
mandatory retirement at age sixty-two was an intentional violation of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).' 43 The company
adopted its new retirement plan on January 1, 1974, and notified em-
ployees of the plan by the latter part of 1974. One hundred and forty-
three terminations under the new plan occurred between February 1976
and October 1977. In October 1977 Home Insurance raised the
mandatory retirement age to sixty-five. EEOC filed a complaint on be-
half of the terminated employees on December 28, 1978.'"
To determine whether monetary relief was available to the 143
plaintiffs, the court first had to determine whether the complaint was
timely. Home Insurance argued that the plaintiffs' cause of action ac-
crued in 1974, when they were notified of the retirement policy.'45
Thus, their complaint was not filed within two or three years of the
violation, the statute of limitations under the ADEA. EEOC argued, in-
ter alia, that a cause of action did not accrue until the 143 persons were
due to receive their retirement incomes.' 4
140. Roberts, 650 F.2d at 825.
141. Id. at 827. The court stated:
[I]f there is a continuing violation, the company is continually violating Title VII so long as
its discriminatory policy remains in effect. An applicant for employment or promotion will, in
many circumstances, be interested in any suitable position which opens up. As job openings
become available, the applicant will automatically be rejected because of his/her race, sex or
national origin. We see no reason to formalistically require an applicant to continuously ap-
ply, only to be continuously rejected. We do not think that Title VII requires that suit be
filed when the applicant is initially discriminated against. If an ongoing discriminatory policy
is in effect, the violation of Title VII is ongoing as well.
Id.
142. 553 F. Supp. 704.
143. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
144. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), (c) (1982) (stating that EEOC has authority under the ADEA to
file complaints on behalf of aggrieved employees).
145. 553 F. Supp. at 709.
146. Id. at 711.
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The district court held that the plan could be challenged as long as
it continued to exist. The court also found that the statute of limita-
tions on a cause of action for an employee alleging termination under
an unlawful retirement plan does not begin to run until the last day of
employment or until the unlawful provision is discontinued, whichever
occurs earlier. 147 The court stated that the date of notification test de-
veloped in Delaware College v. Ricks should not be used because the
continued existence of a discriminatory policy rendered inapplicable the
justification for the statute of limitations-to prevent litigation of stale
claims. 4"
Because the ongoing policy standard does not require that specific
acts of discrimination occur before a plaintiff may challenge an alleged
policy of discrimination, it provides plaintiffs with maximum flexibility
in filing their charges. Prior discussions of the less flexible date-of-noti-
fication/injury and manifestation/enforcement standards have shown
that waiting for an act to occur under the policy could result in unduly
delaying or restricting challenges to alleged discriminatory policies. By
focusing on the nature of the violation, the ongoing policy standard
avoids procedural obstacles to the elimination of systemic discrimina-
tion. Under this standard, determining when a plaintiff may challenge
systemic discrimination is secondary to determining whether systemic
discrimination exists. Thus, this standard best effectuates Title VII's
goal of eliminating such discrimination.
In addition to best effectuating the goals of Title VII, the ongoing
policy standard also promotes consistency in application of the continu-
ing violation theory. The lack of a consistent judicial standard in cases
applying the continuing violation theory to systemic discrimination has
been a major problem in employment discrimination law.149 This Arti-
cle has discussed conflicting standards among the circuits, such as ap-
plication of the theory to discriminatory tests, but conflicting standards
also exist within the same circuit. A New York District Court, for exam-
ple, applied the ongoing policy standard to a facially discriminatory
147. Id. at 712-13. The court stated:
[A]doption and maintenance of an unlawful mandatory retirement policy [is] a continuing
violation in the sense of a discriminatory "condition of employment" . . . . [A] suit-or an
EEOC charge-against the maintenance of Home's mandatory retirement policy would be
timely filed so long as the provision was maintained at least into the applicable limitations
period prior to the filing.. . . Such a suit could be brought by either the EEOC, a newly hired
employee, or . .. any then-employed individual, for injunctive and, if available, monetary
relief.
Id. at 712 (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 712-13.
149. See B. SCHLEI & P. GRossMAN, supra note 3, at 1047.
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pension plan, 150 but, in a later case, the Second Circuit applied the
date-of-notification/injury standard to an apparently neutral pension
plan. 5" The Seventh Circuit applied the ongoing policy standard to a
facially discriminatory pension plan,'52 but applied an equivalent of the
date-of-notification/injury standard to a "facially-neutral but discrimi-
natory seniority system."15 3 The rationale for the different standards is
not always clear; nor is a given rationale always logical.15 4 The ongoing
policy standard provides a consistent judicial standard that will allow
plaintiffs to know with a greater degree of certainty whether their
charges are filed timely.
Since an employer may be engaging in a continuing violation, why
should there be any restriction on the plaintiff's right to challenge the
violation? This question necessarily results from the reasoning in
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman that the policy constitutes the present
violation; therefore, the rationale for a narrow interpretation of the
statute of limitations no longer exists. Havens did restrict a plaintiff's
right to challenge a continuing violation, but this restriction related
more to proving the existence of a present violation than to restricting
the right to challenge that violation.
In Havens proof of an alleged policy of discrimination was based on
an accumulation of several specific incidents of discrimination. Even
when proof of an alleged policy of discrimination is based on several
discrete events, though, plaintiffs first must show that at least one of
those discrete events has occurred within the limitations period, for the
Supreme Court still requires the existence of a present alleged viola-
tion.'5" Under this view the discrete event or asserted occurrence consti-
tutes proof of the present alleged violation. Thus, any plaintiff affected
by the policy may file a complaint within 180 days of the event that
proved the existence of a present violation. By contrast, when employ-
ees challenge formal employer policies as continuing violations, the ex-
istence of the formal policy is proof of the existence of a present alleged
violation. Because the policy is the present alleged violation, the only
remaining issue is whether that policy is in fact discriminatory.
The holding in Havens related to how one proves a present viola-
150. Home Ins. Co., 553 F. Supp. at 704.
151. O'Malley v. GTE Serv. Corp., 758 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1985). The Second Circuit cited
with approval the holding of Home Insurance in this case. Id. at 821.
152. Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939
(1971).
153. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 827 F.2d 163, 167 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. filed, 56
U.S.L.W. 3627 (Feb. 26, 1988) (No. 87-1428).
154. See Jackson & Matheson, supra note 2, at 822-23.
155. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977); see also supra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text.
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tion; thus, the manifestation/enforcement standard must be analyzed in
light of whether it effectuates the remedial purpose of Title VII. The
prior discussion of the deficiencies of the standard leads to the conclu-
sion that it does not effectuate that purpose. Because Title VII requires
that a charge of discrimination be filed within 180 days of the alleged
unlawful employment practice, a plaintiff always should be allowed to
challenge a continuing violation based on systemic discrimination, for
that constitutes the unlawful employment practice. The statute of limi-
tations should not begin to run until an employee subject to the policy
resigns or is discharged, or until the policy is discontinued.156 For pro-
spective employees rejected from a job or deferred from applying be-
cause of a discriminatory hiring policy, a charge should be considered
timely as long as the policy exists. The statute of limitations for these
claims should not begin to run until the policy is discontinued.
V. CONCLUSION
In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,157 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that an allegation of systemic discrimination under the Fair
Housing Act is serious enough to warrant redefining the violation as a
continuing violation and interpreting the statute of limitations in a
manner that facilitates elimination of continuing violations. This inter-
pretation effectuates the Fair Housing Act's goal of eliminating sys-
temic discrimination. This goal, also expressed in Title VII, is aimed at
eliminating those policies and practices that affect not just an individ-
ual, but an entire class of persons. For the Fair Housing Act, the mani-
festation/enforcement standard facilitates achievement of that goal.
Only the ongoing policy standard, however, facilitates achievement of
that goal under Title VII.
Despite the fact that Title VII is over twenty years old, employers
continue to use discriminatory policies that deny employment opportu-
nities to blacks, women, Hispanics, older workers, and other minority
groups, with resulting economic, social, and psychological consequences.
156. Whether a person is subject to the policy, that is, whether a person has standing to
challenge a policy, has been interpreted broadly by courts. In International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the Supreme Court stated that an aggrieved party does
not have to be injured specifically (i.e., rejected from a job) by an allegedly discriminatory policy,
because the policy may deter a person from pursuing an employment opportunity. Id. at 363. In
the case of allegedly discriminatory tests, courts have held that an individual challenging a test
must be affected adversely by the test. Similarly, with an educational qualification, such as a col-
lege degree, the aggrieved party must be one who is disqualified because of the requirement. In
general, determining who has standing to challenge a policy depends upon the policy being chal-
lenged. Compare Walls v. Mississippi Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 730 F.2d 306, 314-15, 318-19 (5th Cir.
1984) with 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 3, §§ 49.12, 49.51(a).
157. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
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Litigation by private plaintiffs has been a major means of eliminating
these policies. The future role of private litigation depends, in part,
upon judicial recognition of the importance of eliminating systemic dis-
crimination. This recognition should lead courts to construe liberally
the procedural provisions of Title VII. Plaintiffs who challenge this dis-
crimination should not be burdened with "procedural labyrinths" '158
that allow employers to escape or delay legal challenges to arguably dis-
criminatory policies.
In 1975 the Supreme Court stated that the prospect of back pay
liability should provide a catalyst for employers and unions to examine
their employment policies for effects on groups that traditionally have
been excluded from participating fully in the American society.'59
Based on the continuing existence of arguably discriminatory policies,
the prospect of back pay liability has failed to provide that catalyst.
Filing charges and litigation continue to be the primary catalysts for
examining possibly discriminatory employment policies, and courts
should facilitate challenges to these policies by allowing plaintiffs maxi-
mum flexibility in filing charges of systemic discrimination.
158. Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
159. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
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